Both the US and South Korea spend millions on intelligence, especially following North Korea.
In the wake of much breast beating about how the two countries intelligence failure on having the finger on the pulse of what’s going on in the DPRK, we truly have to wonder about and put under a laser beam the information put out by the two governments, acolytes in the press, the universities and think tanks, business circles & the like. On a cost benefit analysis, neither country is get a big bang for its dollar or won spent.
Yeh, we know the intelligence community has a job to do: we question its quality and output for the results are often sloppy, of inferior analyses, and wandering into the celestial stars.
The death of Kim Jong il proved that the whole ball of intelligence wax had more to do with lunar green cheese than realty. The media and the White House and Blue House keep banging the drums of fear and instability in northeast Asia, if not implying that an outbreak of war is on the horizon owing to a power struggle within North Korea’s senior military leaders.
What GuamDiary sees is that the US and ROK intelligence network is being payed to mouth the hoary propaganda of the governments that pay them. You get what you pay for, the saying goes, and forced timelines and hothouse nuturing of bankrupt ideologies are what the US and South Korean people are being asked to swallow.
If instability is on the horizon, look to Washington and Seoul for military adventurism and kick ’em in the stomach when it comes to North Korea. The Obama administration and the revanchist Lee Myung bak government in Seoul have bet on the collapse of the DPRK with the death of Kim Jong il. And, surprise, surprise, that ain’t going to happen. GuamDiary scratches its head and wonders aloud ‘haven’t the US and ROK spooks have the slightest klew as to the motor which has driven and continues to drive North Korean history and behavior, yea, these past 80 years?’
The only logic answer is that they are obvious to anything but their own fears, projections, and scenarios which Freud would ‘wish fulfillment’.
So, in the end, can we truly trust US and South Korean intelligence on North Korea? We do not deny that the end product of their work has a pinch of salt of versimilitude, but on the whole, we have to read more widely and weigh their conjectives with a cold, critical eye. So we have more reason to distruct US and ROK intelligence, in the final analysis.